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Casenotes
BROWN v. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.:
YOU MAKE THE CALL!
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine overtime at the Super Bowl, where the first team to
score wins. It is first and ten, the ball is snapped, the quarterback
throws it to the receiver; but wait, the defensive player pulled the
receiver's jersey over his head. The defensive player intercepts the
ball, and runs for a ninety yard touchdown. No penalty is called.
In 1997, professional sports involve not only the game played
on the field, but also an off-the-field game played between players
and owners.' In the past twenty years, courts have heard numerous
claims from both players and owners alleging antitrust law viola-
tions.2 These claims usually stem from the collective bargaining
process.3 In the collective bargaining process, teams are supposed
to meet on neutral ground with their own bargaining power and
1. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DuKE L.J. 339.
2. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that nonstatutory labor exemption precluded antitrust challenge to continued
imposition of terms of expired collective bargaining agreement, after impasse was
reached in negotiations); Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws extends
beyond impasse); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating that prohibition in collective bargaining agreement on player corpo-
rations could not be challenged on antitrust grounds); McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (concluding that nonstatutory labor ex-
emption applies where term of employment was incorporated into collective bar-
gaining agreement as result of good faith, arm's length bargaining); Smith v. Pro
Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C.), affid in part, revd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (finding football league actions anti-competitive and unreasonable, and
therefore subject to antitrust liability); Mackey v. National Football League, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, NFL v. Mackey, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (hold-
ing that nonstatutory labor exemption cannot be involved where agreement is not
product of bona fide negotiations); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F.
Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding that restrictions in collective bargaining agree-
ment do not lose their antitrust immunity upon expiration of the agreement, but
may not be continued indefinitely by employer following expiration of collective
bargaining agreement); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding league was not entitled to advantage of labor exemption
from antitrust laws).
3. For a list of cases involving such claims, see supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
(87)
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with their own strategies to use in bargaining with the other side.4
The object of the game is to reach an agreement.5 Both sides are
fighting for their terms and conditions in the new collective bar-
gaining agreement. 6 What happens, though, if one team pulls the
other teams'jerseys over their heads? Is that a penalty? Or is that a
legitimate action?
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.,7 held that team owners could lawfully impose unilat-
eral restraints on the players (pull the jersey over their heads), after
collective bargaining reached impasse (overtime), thereby winning
the collective bargaining game. The players claimed that this uni-
lateral imposition of restraints violated antitrust law.8 The Supreme
Court held, however, that the nonstatutory labor exemption is ap-
plicable after bargaining reaches impasse, and therefore, the own-
ers actions were lawful. 9
This Note discusses the Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.10 decision in
light of the nonstatutory labor exemption and its applicability in
the collective bargaining process. Section II describes the history of
the nonstatutory labor exemption, and its evolution from the time
Congress enacted the antitrust laws until the recent Brown deci-
4. See The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (stating that
employees have right to bargain collectively). Under the National Labor Relations
Act it is considered an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158. Section 157 states that "[elmployees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form,join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ... " 29 U.S.C. § 157.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1994). Under §141:
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and
with the full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can
be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor
organizations each recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in
their relations with each other, and above all recognize under law that
neither party has any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts
or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.
Id.
6. See id.
7. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
8. See id. For a discussion on impasse, see infra note 61 and accompanying
text concerning free market and competition in the antitrust laws.
9. See id. The court held that the employers imposition of unilateral restraints
on the players, after negotiations reached impasse, was not a violation of the anti-
trust laws because the nonstatutory exemption was still applicable. See id. at 2120.
For a discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see infra notes 40-57 and
accompanying text.
10. 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
[Vol. 4: p. 87
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sion. 11 Section III describes the factual background surrounding
the Brown decision. 12 Section IV discusses the reasoning behind the
majority's decision, and sets forth the opposing views of the dis-
sent.'3 Section V examines the Brown decision in light of congres-
sional enactments, Supreme Court interpretations of the
nonstatutory labor exemption and legislative history.14 Section VI
provides a discussion concerning the impact of the Brown decision
on the future of the collective bargaining process in general and as
applied to professional sports.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. Labor Exemption From Antitrust Law
Through the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act)
the federal government regulates anti-competitive business behav-
ior. 16 Congress enacted the Sherman Act to regulate trade prac-
tices among competitors in interstate commerce.' 7 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act forbids contracts, combinations or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade,1 8 while section 2 of the Act prohibits monopoliza-
tion of trade or commerce.' 9
11. See infra notes 16-120 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 133-192 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 193-215 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 216-221 and accompanying text.
16. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)) [hereinafter Sherman Act]. See also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (holding that
Congress enacted Sherman Act to promote competitive economy); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (holding that Sherman Act was "designed
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade"); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d
520, 536 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that Court has instead stressed that antitrust laws
seek to protect competition); LAURENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF TmE LAw OF ANir-
TRUST 14 (1977) (stating that "general objective of the antitrust laws is the mainte-
nance of competition").
17. See SULIvAN, supra note 16, at 136 (stating "[c]onduct tending to raise
barriers can be recognized as conduct which facilitates the achievement of monop-
oly."). See also HERBERT HovENtrimP, ECONOMICS & FEDERAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS,
142-45 (1985) (discussing monopolization and requirements to prove certain con-
duct is monopoly power).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal." Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other persons .. . shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
1997]
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In response to consequences stemming from the application of
the Sherman Act on labor activities, 20 Congress passed the Clayton
Act in 1914, which provides that both labor unions and labor activi-
ties are protected from the Sherman Act.2 1 The Clayton Act is di-
rected toward anti-competitive behavior by individual as well as
group competitors.22 Section 6 of the Clayton Act states that labor
is not to be considered commerce, thereby exempting labor unions
from antitrust laws.2 3 Meanwhile, section 17 of the Clayton Act 24
and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,25 exempt labor union activities from
20. See Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws - A Preliminary Analysis, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955). The general language of the Sherman Act made it easy
for government officials to stop strikes which they considered threatening the pub-
lic welfare. See id. at 256. The United States has successfully argued in the past
that a worker's strike was a Sherman Act violation. See, e.g., United States v. Work-
ingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed. 994, 1000 (C.C.E.D.
1893). The district court held that:
[t] he evil, as well as the unlawfulness of the act of the defendants, consists
in this: that, until certain demands of theirs were compiled with, they
endeavored to prevent, and did prevent, everybody from moving the
commerce of the country.
Id.
21. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994)).
22. SeeAllen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945). The
Bradley Court held that "[s ] ection 6 of the Clayton Act declares that the Sherman
Act must not be so construed as to forbid the 'existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual
help . . . .' But 'the purposes of mutual help' can hardly be thought to cover
activities for the purpose of 'employer-help' in controlling markets and prices." Id.
See also Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976)
(concluding that § 6 and § 20 of Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act are basic
sources for labor exemption to antitrust law); Cox, supra note 20 at 254 (explain-
ing that "Clayton Act made it plain that the mere formation of a labor union is not
an unlawful combination in restraint of trade or commerce.").
23. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticul-
tural organizations."Id.
24. See id.
25. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1994)). The Act explicitly formulated the public policy
with regard to industrial conflict stating that:
[w]hereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid
of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the cor-
porate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorgan-
ized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be
free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
[Vol. 4: p. 87
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antitrust law and place restrictions on the power of the federal
courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes. 26
B. Statutory Exemption
Though the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act do not con-
tain specific language expressing a labor exemption from the Sher-
man Act, the Supreme Court has interpreted the language of these
statutes to waive antitrust liability for unilateral labor conduct, such
as boycotts and picketing.27 This exemption to antitrust laws is
known as the statutory labor exemption.28
The Supreme Court expanded upon the application of the
statutory labor exemption in United States v. Hutcheson2 9 when it
held that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act must all be read in conjunction with each other to deter-
mine whether a labor union has violated antitrust law.30 In
Hutcheson, the employer, Anheuser-Busch, and the carpenters'
union were involved in a labor dispute which lead to the carpenters
representatives or in self-organization or in other-concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
26. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d Cir.
1995) (explaining how Norris-LaGuardia Act barred federal courts from granting
injunctions against firms who join employer organizations); California State Coun-
cil of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 535 (9th Cir. 1981)
rev'd, 459 U.S. 1141 (1982) (holding that statutory exemption in § 4 of Norris-La-
Guardia Act, when read with § 20 of Clayton Act, exempts from antitrust law those
who become members of employer organization); Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does
the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1045, 1049 (1994) (noting that Norris-LaGuardia Act and Clayton Act cre-
ate exemption protecting certain union activities from antitrust law).
27. See Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). The Court in Connell held that, when read together,
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts put forth the principle that labor unions
do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. Further, the Court found that
specific union activities, such as boycotts and picketing, were also exempt. See id.
See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 230 (1941) (holding that § 20 of
Clayton Act puts forth enumerated labor union activities which are not subject to
Sherman Act). In Hutcheson, the majority held that as long as the union acts in its
self-interest and is not combined with a non-labor group, this combination of em-
ployees is not subject to the Sherman Act, regardless of the objective. See id. See
generally, Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutoy
Labor Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 874, 877 (1991) (explaining statutory labor ex-
emption was established in order to advance labor policy).
28. See Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatu-
tory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. Rxv. at 877. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act to have created a statutory labor
exemption from antitrust law for unions. See id.
29. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
30. See id. at 231. The Hutcheson Court held that these three statutes should
be read "as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct." Id.
1997]
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strike.31 The carpenters attempted to persuade members of other
unions not to do work for Anheuser-Busch.3 2 The carpenter's
union was charged with engaging in union activities in violation of
sections one and two of the Sherman Act.3 3 The carpenters argued
that they were exempt from antitrust laws under the statutory labor
exemption. 34 Recognizing congressional intent to protect labor un-
ions from antitrust law through the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts, the Court held that the carpenters' actions were protected
from antitrust liability under the statutory labor exemption.35
The Supreme Court confronted the statutory labor exemption
again in Allen Bradley v. Local Union No. 3,36 and held that it was a
violation of the Sherman Act for a labor union and its members to
combine with manufacturers to restrain competition. 37 The Court,
following its decision in Hutcheson,38 held that the statutory labor
31. See id. at 228. Anheuser-Busch, a manufacturer, rejected the carpenters'
demand for exclusive rights to all jobs involving the erecting and dismantling of
machinery. See id. Anheuser-Busch refused the carpenters' demand and the
carpenters, refusing to arbitrate, went on strike. See id.
32. See id. The carpenters attempted to dissuade the other unions through
picketing and written correspondence. See id.
33. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2).
34. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 228. The carpenters' union filed demurrers de-
nying that their actions violated antitrust law. See id.
35. See id. at 236. The Court looked at the legislative history of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act. See id. at 235. The Court noted that the
House Committee on the Judiciary stated "'[t] he purpose of the bill is to protect
the rights of labor in the same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the
Clayton Act.'" Id. (quoting H. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (March 2,
1932)). In conclusion, the Court held that:
[t]he Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clay-
ton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as rede-
fined by the later Act. In this light § 20 removes all such allowable
conduct from the taint of being a "violation of any law of the United
States," including the Sherman Law.
Id. at 236.
36. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
37. See id. at 812-13. The union, using conventional labor union methods,
attempted to expand employment opportunities for its members. See id. at 798-99.
The union used tactics such as boycotts to get all the contractors and manufactur-
ers in the city to agree to closed-shop agreements. See id. Under these agreements
the contractors agreed to purchase equipment from only those manufacturers who
had closed-shop agreements with the union. See id. Inevitably, the union and the
manufacturers "stifled the competition,"causing manufacturers outside the city,
who lacked closed-shop agreements with the union, to file a suit claiming that the
union had violated antitrust law. See id.
38. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). For a discussion of Hutcheson, see supra notes 29-35
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4: p. 87
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exemption is not automatic, but rather is conditioned upon the
union's actions.
39
C. Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
The Supreme Court, while establishing the statutory labor ex-
emption for unilateral collective bargaining tactics, 40 also estab-
lished a nonstatutory labor exemption that immunizes from antitrust
laws the results of the collective bargaining process between unions
and employers. 41 The Court realized the need for a nonstatutory
labor exemption as a result of the conflict between the congres-
sional policy favoring collective bargaining under the National La-
bor Relations Act 42 (NLRA) and the congressional policy favoring
free competition in business under the Sherman Act.4 3 The non-
statutory labor exemption protects both unions and employers
from antitrust law challenges to certain results of the collective bar-
39. See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810. The Court held that "the same labor
union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent
upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups." Id.
See also United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965)
(citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)) (holding statutory exemp-
tion did not apply when union and non-union group tried to prevent competition
from others); Jonathon C. Latimer, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor Costs
Through Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U.L. REv. 205, 212 (Fall 1994) (explaining
that Hutcheson Court intended statutory exemption apply to union activities, so
long as union does not join with non-union group).
40. See Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatu-
tory Labor Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 874, 877 (1991) ("[t]he statutory labor ex-
emption immunizes certain agreements essential to the structure and economic
warfare of the collective bargaining process: the agreements among employees to
organize a union, to make coordinated proposals, and to engage in 'unilateral'
collective tactics such as strikes (or lockouts).").
41. See id. at 877-78 (stating "nonstatutory exemption protects union-em-
ployer agreements that standardize wages and working conditions; these agree-
ments are the usual result of collective bargaining."); see e.g., Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (finding nonstatutory labor exemption
applicable to multi-union/multi-employer agreement concerning closing food
stores at specific times).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (as amended 1994). The NLRA states that "to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees . . . ." Id.
43. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975). The Connell Court recognized the conflict between the congressional
policy favoring collective bargaining and the congressional policy favoring free
competition in business markets. See id. The Court held the nonstatutory exemp-
tion as the proper accommodation to balance these two conflicting interests. See
id. See also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965) (holding
that nonstatutory labor exemption for union-employer agreements is necessary to
reconcile Sherman Act and labor laws).
1997]
7
Bryant: Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: You Make the Call
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
94 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOuRNAL
gaining process.44 Although the Court has recognized this nonstat-
utory labor exemption to antitrust laws, it has not set the
exemption's parameters; rather it has only established the exemp-
tion's general boundaries. 45
The Supreme Court defined one of the boundaries to the non-
statutory labor exemption in United Mine Workers v. Pennington.46 In
Pennington, the Supreme Court decided whether an agreement be-
tween a labor union and large coal mine operators that secured
uniform labor standards in the mining industry was exempt from
antitrust law.47 The Court found that the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption to antitrust laws did not apply to the agreement between
the union and industry operators even though the agreement in-
cluded wage standards. 48 The Pennington Court concluded that a
union forfeits its nonstatutory labor exemption when it conspires to
eliminate competitors from an industry.49 The Supreme Court fur-
44. See e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding that nonstatutory exemption is applicable in agreements negoti-
ated in collective bargaining); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840,
847 n.14 (3d Cir. -1974) (stating that "[c]ongress has seen fit to grant labor unions
a limited exemption from antitrust liability .... Provided that unions act in their
own self-interest in an area which 'is a proper subject of union concern.'"). For
further discussion concerning exemption in collective bargaining, see supra note
37-39 and accompanying text.
45. See Lock, supra note 1, at 352. The scope of the exemption is not defined.
See id. The Supreme Court has established certain minimal requirements of a col-
lective bargaining agreement that will be exempt from antitrust laws, but these
decisions do not set forth a general standard for applying the exemption. See id.
(citing Connell Constr. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. at 622-23; Jewel
Tea, 381 U.S. at 664-66)). See also Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679 (determining union-
employer contract concerning amount of working hours is exempt from antitrust
liability); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965) (holding
that agreement between union and manufacturers "to secure uniform labor stan-
dards throughout the industry... was not exempt from the antitrust laws"); Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (concluding that unions are
not exempt from antitrust law when they join with employers to restrain competi-
tion and monopolize market).
46. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
47. See id. The mine workers sued the owners of the coal company for royalty
payments due them under the National Coal Wage Agreement of 1950. See id. at
659. The owners cross claimed for damages alleging that the mine workers vio-
lated antitrust laws by taking steps to exclude the marketing, production and sale
of non-union coal. See id. at 660.
48. See id. at 665. The union argued that the nonstatutory labor exemption
was applicable since the agreement between the union and industry operators in-
cluded wages, a mandatory bargaining subject under the NLRA. See id. at 664. The
Court, however, concluded that a union is not automatically exempt under the
nonstatutory labor exemption simply because negotiations involved an aspect of
labor that is protected under the NLRA. See id. Therefore, the court found that
the exemption did not protect the agreement from antitrust suit. See id.
49. See id. at 665-66. The Court held that there is nothing in labor relations
policy "indicating that the union and the employers in one bargaining unit are
[Vol. 4: p. 87
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ther clarified the boundaries of the nonstatutory labor exemption
in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea.50 The Court held that a
provision restricting marketing hours, which was established
through an agreement between the union and the meat retailers,
was exempt from antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption. 51 The Court balanced the interests of the NLRA and the
union against the impact of the working hours agreement on the
product market.52 The Court concluded that the time restrictions
agreement, which was a result of bona fide bargaining, did not have
a sufficient impact on the product market to cause the forfeiture of
the nonstatutory labor exemption.53 Thus, the Court held that the
agreement was exempt from antitrust liability. 54
More recently in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfit-
ters Local Union 100,5 5 the Supreme Court held that the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption is not applicable where a union imposes
direct restraints on competition by forcing contractors to subcon-
tract work only to firms that have collective bargaining agreements
with the union.56 The Court found that the agreement was a direct
restraint on free market competition and that these substantial anti-
competitive effects, created by the agreement, would not follow nat-
free to bargain about the wages, hours and working conditions of other bargaining
units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire industry." Id. at 666.
50. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
51. See id. The union and meatcutter employers agreed in the collective bar-
gaining agreement to limit the amount of hours in the day during which they
would sell fresh meat. See id. at 680. Jewel Tea was one of the employers who did
not sign the agreement. See id. Jewel Tea voiced its contradicting opinion about
the selling restrictions and made a counteroffer that included Friday night opera-
tions in addition to the other selling times agreed upon. See id. The offer was
rejected by the union, which then proceeded to strike againstJewel Tea. See id. at
681. Under duress from the union strike,Jewel Tea signed the agreement between
the union and the other employers. See id. Jewel Tea then brought suit against the
union, alleging a violation of the Sherman Act through the conspiracy to imple-
ment the retail meat selling time restrictions. See id.
52. See id. at 689-90.
53. See id. at 691. The Court determined that the national labor policy ex-
pressed in the National Labor Relations Act "places beyond the reach of the Sher-
man Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees
must work."Id.
54. See id. at 734. The Court held that "Jewel's argument - when considered
against the historical background of union concern with working hours and oper-
ating hours and the virtually uniform recognition by employers of the intimate
relationship between the two subjects. . . - falls far short" Id.
55. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
56. See id. at 635. The union asked Connell to only subcontract work to firms
that had a contract with the union. See id. at 619. When Connell refused, the
union picketed in front of Connell's construction sites. See id. Connell signed the
agreement with Local 100, but then sought a declaration from the appellate court
that the agreement was invalid because it violated antitrust law. See id.
1997]
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urally from the elimination of competition based on wages and
working conditions. 57
D. The NLRA
After the passage of the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act,
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act, which encour-
ages the practice of collective bargaining between employers and
employees.58 The NLRA requires "the mutual obligation of the em-
ployers and the representative of the employees to meet at reason-
able times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."59 The NLRA's
collective bargaining requirement is bilateral, protecting both em-
ployers and unions.60 While protecting both parties, the NLRA
provides unions protection against the unilateral action of an em-
ployer from the commencement of negotiations until impasse is
reached. 61 The NLRA requires good faith bargaining, but "does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak-
ing of a concession." 62 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated
that the role of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under
the NLRA is "to oversee and referee the process of collective bar-
gaining, leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining
strengths of the parties."63
57. See id. at 623-25. The Court held that Local 100 had no interest in repre-
senting Connell's employees. See id. Therefore, the federal policy favoring collec-
tive bargaining offered no shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell.
See id. at 626.
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). For a discussion of the NLRA, see supra note 4
and accompanying text. See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477, 489 (1960) (concluding that collective bargaining is policy of NLRA).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
60. See NLRB v. Washington Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (holding that un-
ions may strike). The NLRA provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in anyway the right to strike." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994). See also
American Ship Bldg. Co., v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1965) (stating that em-
ployers may lock out workers).
61. See Southwestern Steel & Supply, Inc. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 1111, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). See also Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth
Circuit Sacks the National Football League Players Association, 67 DENV. U.L. REv. 135,
148 (1990) (defining "impasse"as meaning "that the bargaining process, intended
to be protected by the exemption, has stopped"). The point of impasse is signifi-
cant because at that point the employer is permitted to impose restraints upon
employees that were negotiated in the pre-impasse bargaining process. See id. The
imposed restraint is actually a "unilateral rule"forced on the employee. See id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
63. H.I. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970). The Supreme Court held
that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has the duty of carrying out the
policies of the NLRA. See id. The Court emphasized that "allowing the Board to
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E. The Sherman Act
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote competition. 64
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce... is hereby declared to be illegal."65 Further,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids monopolies. 66 The Sherman
Act read literally "would condemn many legitimate and necessary
business activities."67 The Supreme Court, however, held that Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act forbids only those restraints of trade that
are deemed to be "unreasonable."68 The Supreme Court has im-
plemented two separate standards in deciding whether a particular
restraint on trade is unreasonable: the per se rule and the rule of
reason.
69
Under the per se rule, labor practices that are inherently un-
reasonable restraints of trade will be invalidated.70 Under the rule
of reason, a court engages in a more thorough examination of the
labor practice in question, and "considers the history and econom-
ics of the relevant industry against the reasonableness of the re-
straint of trade."71 If a restraint of trade fails the per se test, further
examination of the labor practice is not necessary. 72
compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate
the fundamental premise on which the Act is based - private bargaining under
governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion
over the terms of the contract." Id.
64. See Lock, supra note 1, at 343 (discussing Sherman Act as promoting com-
petition); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing protective char-
acter of Sherman Act).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
67. Lock, supra note 1, at 343.
68. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). The Supreme Court
concluded that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent unreasonable restraints
of trade. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The
Court held that the per se rule invalidates certain restraints which are inherently
unreasonable. See id. The Court defined the per se rule as: "certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore ille-
gal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use." Id. at 518. See also SuLivrAN, supra note 16, at 192-94
(discussing power, purpose and effect of per se rule analysis).
71. Latimer, supra note 39, at 219 (explaining that if restraint has clear eco-
nomic necessity causing indirect effect on trade, then restraint will be found
reasonable).
72. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding that some practices are so anti-competitive that they fail per se test,
and courts therefore do not need to apply rule of reason test); see Northern Pac.
1997]
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F. Antitrust and Professional Sports
Professional sports presents a distinct challenge to antitrust
law. 73 In the early stages of litigation involving the professional
sports industry, the owners argued against the application of the
per se rule to professional sports restraints.7 4 The owners argued
that the per se rule was inapplicable to the unique situation of pro-
fessional sports because of the economic interdependence among
the teams, and that it was necessary and reasonable, under the rule
of reason, that the owners control the movement of players within
the league.75
1. Nonstatutory Labor Exemption and Professional Sports
Due to the special relationship between owners and players in
the professional sports industry, courts have encountered difficul-
ties applying the rule of reason and the per se rule.76 In Mackey v.
NFL,77 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
rejected the per se rule, and laid out a three prong test applicable
to cases involving the professional sports industry.78 Since Mackey,
courts have adopted the Mackey test as the standard in conflicts in-
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding per se rule presumes certain
restraints are unreasonable).
73. See Corcoran, supra note 26, at 1053.
74. See e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D.
Minn. 1976) (discussing how National Football League (NFL) argued "Rozelle
Rule"was reasonable restraint on trade), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). See
alsoJ. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 594-95 (1979) (dis-
cussing arguments for and against per se standard in sports).
75. See SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1972, at 62. See also Lock, supra note 1, at
345 (discussing unique aspects of competition in sports industry). Competition
within the sports industry differs from that of other industries. See Lock, supra note
1, at 345. Sports teams in a league profit from each other. See id. If the teams
within a league compete with each other for the best players, with no restrictions
on price, the constant outbidding of each team to provide the most money for the
best players will cause the league as a whole to suffer. See id. The increase in cost
to the teams would fall onto the fans, which would inevitably cause the owners and
the league to diminish in quality. See id. The sports industry provides entertain-
ment to the fans, and it requires that all teams work together to make a profit
because one team can not survive without the other teams in the league. See id. See
e.g., United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa.
1953) (holding professional sports teams cannot compete in same sense that other
industries compete).
76. See Mackey v. United States, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 614. The three prong test used in determining whether the ex-
emption applies is as follows: 1. the restraint must primarily affect only those par-
ties to the collective bargaining relationship; 2. the agreement considered for
exemption must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and 3. the
agreement must be a product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. See id.
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volving professional sports.79 The Mackey court concluded that for
the nonstatutory labor exemption to apply, a term of employment
placed on the players by the owners must have been negotiated in
collective bargaining. 80 Thus, while the Mackey court established a
standard for applying the exemption, it did not decide how long
the term of employment remains past the collective bargaining
agreement's expiration.8
2. Nonstatutory Labor Exemption After Collective Bargaining Agreement
Expires
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether
the nonstatutory labor exemption applies to terms of employment
after the collective bargaining agreement has expired and negotia-
tions have reached impasse.8 2 The Circuit Courts of Appeal are di-
vided on this issue of when the nonstatutory labor exemption
should expire. 83
79. See e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298 (8th Cir.
1989) (applying Mackey framework with respect to nonstatutory labor exemption);
McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979) (recogniz-
ing Mackey as standard to be applied in collective bargaining/antitrust law issue);
Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987) (stat-
ing Mackey is correct starting point in nonstatutory labor exemption analysis);
Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying
Mackey to nonstatutory labor exemption dispute).
80. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623.
81. See id.
82. See Corcoran, supra note 26, at 1059.
83. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing nonstatutory labor exemption precluded antitrust challenge to continued im-
position of terms of expired collective bargaining agreement after impasse was
reached in negotiations); Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws extends
beyond impasse); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating prohibition in collective bargaining agreement on player corpora-
tions could not be challenged on antitrust grounds); McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (concluding nonstatutory labor exemption ap-
plies when term of employment was incorporated into collective bargaining agree-
ment as result of good faith, arm's length bargaining); Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding restrictions in collective
bargaining agreement do not lose their antitrust immunity upon expiration of
agreement, but may not be continued indefinitely by employer following expira-
tion of collective bargaining agreement); Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding football league actions anti-competitive and unreasona-
ble, and therefore subject to antitrust liability); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding nonstatutory labor exemption can-
not be involved where agreement is not product of bona fide negotiations); Rob-
ertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (concluding
that application of exemption depends on subjects of bargaining in dispute).
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In Wood v. National Basketball Association,8 4 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed a player's antitrust claim
challenging certain provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
between the National Basketball Association and National Basket-
ball Players Association.8 5 The court found that the challenged
provisions were mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and
were protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption. 86
Two years after the Second Circuit's decision in Wood, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Powell v.
National Football League,8 7 was faced with the issue of whether the
nonstatutory labor exemption extends beyond impasse. 88 In Powell,
professional football players brought an antitrust action against the
professional football league claiming that the league violated anti-
trust law when it continued to enforce the terms of the expired
collective bargaining agreement.8 9 The court stated that it was in-
fluenced by commentators who suggested that a dispute such as the
one brought before the court should be resolved free of interven-
tion by the courts. 90 The court concluded that the League and the
84. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
85. See id. at 955. The plaintiff alleged that the salary cap, college draft and
prohibition of player corporations violated antitrust law. See id. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York's decision
and dismissed the action. See id.
86. See id. at 962. The court held that the challenged provisions (the salary
cap, college draft and prohibition of player corporations) were mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See id. The court concluded
that the provisions were "intimately related to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment." Id. For a discussion of the mandatory terms of collec-
tive bargaining, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
87. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
88. See id. at 1307. For a discussion on impasse, see supra note 61.
89. See id. at 1295. In 1977, the players and the league entered into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that included new rules to govern veteran free agents.
See id. The new system was called the "First Refusal/Compensation"system. See id.
This new rule mandated that if a veteran free agent was offered a deal from an-
other team, the player's current team would have the right to refuse to let the
players leave by matching the offer of the other team. See id. at 1296. If the
player's current team did not refuse, then the other team would have to give the
player's current team draft choices as compensation. See id. Another agreement
was entered into in 1982, containing the same provisions. See id. In 1987, the 1982
agreement expired and the league continued to maintain the relationship with the
players through a status quo under the terms of the old agreement. See id. The
players went on strike and then filed a complaint in court alleging that the league
violated antitrust law by maintaining the status quo. See id.
90. See id. at 1302. The court stated that "[t]he labor arena is one with well
established rules which are intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than
intervention by the courts." Id. at 1303. Further, the court explained that there are
economic and legal tools which both the players and the league can use to achieve
a resolution to their problem. See id. at 1302. The union has the economic tool to
strike. See id. (citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)). The
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players should continue to bargain, resort to economic force or
present their claims to the NLRB. 91 The court held that the non-
statutory labor exemption extends beyond impasse, and therefore,
the league was not in violation of antitrust law.92
In 1995, the Second Circuit was again faced with the issue of
whether the nonstatutory labor exemption applies after a collective
bargaining agreement expires.93 In National Basketball Ass'n v. Wil-
liams,94 the Second Circuit held that "the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption precluded an antitrust challenge to continued imposition
of terms of expired collective bargaining agreement, after impasse
was reached in negotiations." 95 In Williams, the employers sought
declarations from the district court judgment, which held: (1) that
the continued imposition of the disputed provisions of the CBA
(collective bargaining agreement) would not violate the antitrust
laws because such imposition falls under the nonstatutory exemp-
tion to the antitrust laws; and (2) that the disputed provisions are
lawful even if the antitrust laws apply. 96 The court agreed with the
employers. 97 The court noted its agreement with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Powell v. National Football
League,98 and held that the nonstatutory labor exemption "pre-
cluded an antitrust challenge to various terms and conditions of
employment implemented after impasse." 99 The Williams court
employers, on the other hand, can lock out the union employees. See id. (citing
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965)). Legally, both parties can
petition the NLRB seeking a "cease-and-desist order prohibiting conduct constitut-
ing an unfair labor practice." Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197 (1938)).
91. See id. at 1303. The court strongly urged both parties to continue to bar-
gain, and to resort to economic forces only if necessary. See id.
92. See id. at 1304. The court reversed the order of the district court and
remanded the case with instructions to enterjudgments for the defendants. See id.
The court split on this holding, two to one. See id. at 1293.
93. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. Id.
95. Id. The court held that the antitrust laws 'do not prohibit employers from
bargaining jointly with a union, from implementing their joint proposals in the
absence of a CBA (Collective Bargaining Agreement), or from using economic
force to obtain agreement to those proposals." Id. at 693.
96. See id. at 685. The Southern District Court of New York ruled in favor of
the National Basketball Association. See id. at 684. Williams appealed the dismissal
of their counterclaim alleging that the National Basketball Association violated the
antitrust laws by maintaining the terms in the expired collective bargaining agree-
ment. See id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court decision. See id.
97. See id.
98. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 693 (citing Powell 930 F.2d at 1293).
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concluded that "the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers from
certain actions."100 The court found that limits on such employer
action is found in labor laws. 101
Several other appellate court decisions have created conflict-
ing notions concerning the extent of the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion and its application beyond impasse. 10 2 Opposing circuits have
held that the nonstatutory labor exemption does not extend be-
yond impasse. 10 3 In Smith v. Pro-Football,10 4 James Smith, a profes-
sional football player, brought an antitrust action against the
Professional Football League and Club claiming that he was unable
to negotiate a contract for the true value of his services because of
the player selection draft.10 5
The football league and club argued that the National Football
League (NFL) draft is a mandatory bargaining subject and there-
fore is exempt from antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor
exemption. 10 6 The district court held that the draft was an unrea-
sonable restraint on trade and therefore subject to antitrust law
100. Id. The court held that the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers
from "bargaining jointly with a union, from implementing their joint proposals in
the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, or from using economic force to
obtain agreement to those proposals." Id. at 693 (citing PoweU, 930 F.2d at 1293).
101. See id. The court held that there was an "unspoken assumption"that
multi-employer collective bargaining is not subject to antitrust law. See id. Further,
the court held that any doubts about this unspoken assumption were resolved by
the passage of the federal labor laws. See id.
102. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (con-
cluding nonstatutory labor exemption applies where term of employment was in-
corporated into collective bargaining agreement as result of good faith, arm's
length bargaining); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (find-
ing football league actions anti-competitive and unreasonable, and therefore sub-
ject to antitrust liability); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976) (holding nonstatutory labor exemption cannot be involved where agree-
ment is not product of bona fide negotiations).
103. See supra note 102.
104. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
105. See id. at 1174-75. James Smith was drafted by the Washington Redskins
in 1968 when he graduated from the University of Oregon. See id. at 1176. At the
time Smith was drafted, the National Football League (NFL) had a "no-tamper-
ing"rule pertaining to the draft. See id. The rule stated that no team was allowed
"to negotiate prior to the draft with any player eligible to be drafted, and no team
could negotiate with (or sign) any player selected by another team in the draft." Id.
Only one team had the right to negotiate with a given player. See id. Therefore, if
the player could not reach an agreement with the team that had the exclusive right
to negotiate with him, then the player could not play in the NFL. See id. He signed
a contract with the Redskins. See id. Smith played for the Redskins until the last
game of his first season, when he injured himself and was advised he should end
his football career. See id. Two years after the injury, Smith filed suit. See id. at
1177.
106. See Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F.Supp. 738, 741 (D.C. 1976) (arguing draft
is mandatory collective bargaining subject under National Labor Relations Act).
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challenges.10 7 The Smith court thus concluded that the NFL draft
was not exempt under the nonstatutory labor exemption.108
In 1979, in McCourt v. California Sport,10 9 the Sixth Circuit also
addressed whether the nonstatutory labor exemption extended be-
yond impasse. 110 McCourt, a professional hockey player, claimed
that the National Hockey League reserve system was subject to, and
in violation of, the antitrust laws." 1 The McCourt court applied the
Mackey test to the collective bargaining agreement and found that
the reserve system was incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement through bona fide arm's length bargaining. 1 2 The
court held that because the reserve system was a product of good
faith bargaining it was exempt from antitrust law under the nonstat-
utory labor exemption."13
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1 4 was the first court to de-
107. Id. at 742. The court stated:
[t]he policy of the exemption - allowing the collective bargaining pro-
cess, proceeding unfettered by antitrust restraints, to determine wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment - does not require and
would not be served by extending the exemption to arrangements im-
posed unilaterally by employers, merely because such arrangements
could at some time be settled upon through mandatory collective bar-
gaining. The court held that the draft was an unreasonable restraint on
trade and therefore subject to antitrust law challenges.
Id.
108. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187.
109. 600 F.2d 1193 (1979).
110. See id. at 1197. The court noted that while the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that other professional sports are not exempt from antitrust law in
the way that baseball is, it has never decided the issue of whether the reserve sys-
tem in sports is a violation of the Sherman Act or whether the reserve system is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining and therefore exempt from the Sher-
man Act. See id. The reserve system provided a team, when one of its players be-
came a free agent and signed a contract with a different team, to receive an
.equalization payment"from the player's new team. See id. at 1195. The equaliza-
tion payment was made "by the assignment of contracts of players, by the assign-
ment of draft choices, or as a last resort, by the payment of cash." Id.
111. See id. at 1196.
112. See id. at 1203. The court, agreeing with the express findings of the dis-
trict court but disagreeing with its decision, held that the inclusion of the reserve
system in the collective bargaining agreement was the result of good faith bargain-
ing. See id. The court, in addition to finding that the agreement met the third
standard in the Mackey test (that the agreement was a result of bona fide arm's
length bargaining) also held that the agreement met the standards set forth in the
first two prongs of Mackey. See id. at 1198. For a discussion of the three prong
Mackey test, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
113. See id. at 1203. The court held that "[s]o viewed, the evidence here,....
compels the conclusion that the reserve system was incorporated in the agreement
as a result of good faith, arm's length bargaining between the parties." Id.
114. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
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cide when the nonstatutory labor exemption ceases after the collec-
tive bargaining agreement expires. 1 15 The plaintiffs in Bridgeman
brought a suit against the National Basketball Association (NBA)
claiming that the enforcement by the league of the college player
draft, salary cap and right of first refusal constituted antitrust viola-
tions. 116 The court, placing a limit on the duration of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption, held that after good faith bargaining, the
nonstatutory labor exemption lasts for as long as the employer con-
tinues to impose the particular restraint and "reasonably believes
that the practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the
next [collective bargaining agreement]."11 7 Once the employer's
belief becomes unreasonable, 18 the restraint becomes unilateral,
thereby failing the Mackey test.119 A restraint that fails the Mackey
test is subject to antitrust scrutiny.120
III. FAcrs
In 1987, the collective bargaining agreement involving the
terms and conditions of employment for all professional football
players expired, and the National Football League (NFL) and Na-
tional Football League Players Association (NFLPA) began negotia-
115. See id. at 965. See also Corcoran, supra note 26, at 1061 (noting that
Bridgeman case was first to decide when nonstatutory labor exemption ends after
collective bargaining agreement has expired); Daniel Nester, Labor Exemption to
Antitrust Scrutiny in Professional Sports, 15 S. ILL. U.L.J. 123, 135 (1990) (stating that
Bridgeman court was first to decide when nonstatutory exemption to antitrust law
should expire).
116. See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 963. A collective bargaining agreement
between the players and the NBA expired in 1980. See id. at 962. The 1980 agree-
ment expired at the end of the 1986-87 season, but the terms of the agreement
were to be maintained until a new agreement was made. See id. at 963. During
negotiations for a new agreement, the parties were in dispute concerning the col-
lege draft and the right of first refusal. See id. After considerable negotiation, no
agreement was reached. See id. The players then filed suit against the NBA claim-
ing antitrust law violations because of the continued enforcement of certain terms
after the collective bargaining agreement expired. See id.
117. Id. at 967. The court noted that "a time will come after expiration of the
agreement when the practices that were included in the agreement can no longer
be said to exist as an extension of the agreement. At such time, those practices are
no longer protected by the labor exemption." Id. at 966. See Corcoran, supra note
26, at 1062 (stating that "[o]nce the employer's belief in reincorporation becomes
unreasonable, both parties no longer consent to the restraint.").
118. See Corcoran, supra note 26, at 1062. The Bridgeman court found that as
long as a restraint was expected to be in the next agreement, the restraint was still
considered reasonable by both the union and the employers. See id.
119. See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967. The court noted that when the em-
ployer no longer reasonably believes that the restraint will be included in the next
agreement, the restraint is unreasonable and continued enforcement of it be-
comes a unilateral restraint subject to antitrust law. See id.
120. Id.
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tions for a new collective bargaining agreement. 21 In 1989, while
negotiations for a new agreement were still in session, the NFL own-
ers adopted an amendment to the NFL Constitution establishing a
new "Developmental Players Squad."122 The amendment, known as
Resolution G-2, departed from the customary NFL practice of set-
ting player salaries through individual negotiations and instead es-
tablished a fixed salary for Developmental Players.123
After tiresome negotiations between the NFL and NFLPA over
Resolution G-2, the NFL Management Committee's Executive Di-
rector, Jack Dolan, and the NFLPA's Executive Director, Gene Up-
shaw, met to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment of
the Developmental Squad Players. 12 4 The two directors could not
agree on the fixed salary component of the agreement and the is-
sue was "clearly at impasse." 125 The NFL owners, however, without
NFLPA consent, implemented the Developmental Squad Players
Program.' 2 6
On May 9, 1990, Anthony Brown and eight other Developmen-
tal Squad Players, on behalf of 235 of the Developmental Squad
Players from the 1989 season, brought a class action lawsuit against
all twenty-eight NFL clubs and the NFL.' 27 Brown alleged that the
NFL owners and the NFL violated the Sherman Act by setting a
fixed salary for the Developmental Players Squad. 28
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the owners' unilateral action imposing the salary cap on
the players violated antitrust laws. 129 The court enjoined the NFL
121. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116, 2119 (1996).
122. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The
developmental players squad was composed of practice and replacement players,
in addition to the 47 players on the regular season roster. See id. The amendment
allowed each club to maintain a developmental squad of rookie players, who have
attended NFL training camp in a previous year but played in less than three regu-
lar season games. See id. at n.1.
123. See id. The Resolution did not establish the amount of the salary. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. (citing Letter form Jack Dolan to Hugh Culverhouse et al. (June
16, 1989)).
126. See id. at 1047. The NFL implemented the program by sending uniform
contracts for the developmental players to all teams. See id. All team officials were
advised that paying any Developmental Player more or less than $1,000 per week
would result in disciplinary action, with the threat of future loss of draft choices.
See id.
127. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1047.
128. See id.
129. See id. In June 1991, the District Court granted the player's motion for
partial summary judgment and denied the NFL's cross-motion for summary judg-
ment on the issue of whether the lawsuit was barred by the nonstatutory labor
exemption to antitrust law. See id. (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp.
1997]
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and the owners from ever setting a uniform salary for any players.130
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court holding and found that
the owners acted lawfully when they imposed the fixed salary.13'
The appellate court concluded that the owners' actions were lawful
because the nonstatutory labor exemption precluded liability under
the antitrust laws.' 32
IV. NARRATIvE ANALYsIS
A. Majority Opinion
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,l3 3 the United States Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of whether either the nonstatutory
labor exemption or antitrust law controls when the NFL owners,
after collectively bargaining until impasse, imposed a fixed salary
on the players. 134 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,13 began
the analysis with a detailed look at the origin of the nonstatutory
labor exemption.' 3 6 The Court recognized that the nonstatutory
labor exemption was implemented in order to resolve the conflict
between labor policies favoring collective bargaining and antitrust
policies favoring free markets. 137
125 (D.D.C. 1991)). In March 1992, the District Court granted the player's motion
for summaryjudgment on the antitrust liability claim. See id. (citing Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. P 69, 747 (D.D.C. 1992). In September 1992, the
District Court held a jury trial on the issues of antitrust injury and damages. See id.
The jury awarded damages to the players. See id. (citing Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., Civ. Action 90-1071 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992) (judgment on the verdict).
130. See id. (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. P 70, 260
(D.D.C. 1993).
131. See id.
132. See Brown, 30 F.3d at 1047.
133. 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
134. See id. at 2121. The Brown case is based on a conflict between federal
labor law and antitrust law in the context of a dispute involving the professional
football industry. See id. at 2116.
135. See id. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Jus-
tices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburgjoined.
See id. at 2118.
136. See id. at 2120. The Court noted that the nonstatutory labor exemption
reflects Congress' intentions as established in the labor laws. See id. Further, the
Court has implied this nonstatutory labor exemption from federal labor law stat-
utes. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151; Teamsters v. Oliver, 79 S.Ct. 297, 304 (1959)).
137. See id. at 2120. The nonstatutory labor exemption, an implicit exemp-
tion, recognizes that in order to give full effect to both federal labor laws and
collective bargaining, restraints on competition must be shielded from antitrust
laws. See id. This nonstatutory exemption applies to both unions and employers.
See Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974).
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The Supreme Court held that the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion, as a matter of labor law and policy, extends beyond impasse.13 8
The Court noted that prior history shows that both the NLRB and
the courts have applied the exemption after impasse, thereby al-
lowing employers to unilaterally implement new employment
terms.' 3 9 The NLRB and the courts have allowed this implementa-
tion in multi-employer bargaining cases as well. 140 Justice Breyer
found that to apply the antitrust laws in these situations
would require antitrust courts to answer a host of impor-
tant practical questions about how collective bargaining
over wages, hours and working conditions is to proceed -
the very result that the implicit labor exemption seeks to
avoid. And it is to place in jeopardy some of the poten-
tially beneficial labor-related effects that multiemployer
bargaining can achieve. That is because unlike labor law,
which sometimes welcomes anticompetitive agreements
conducive to industrial harmony, antitrust law forbids all
agreements among competitors (such as competing em-
ployers) that unreasonably lessen competition among or
between them in virtually any respect whatsoever. 41
138. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2121. The Court concluded that the question
before it was "one of determining the exemption's scope: Does it apply to an
agreement among several employers bargaining together to implement after im-
passe the terms of their last best good-faith wage offer?" Id.
139. See id. (citing Storer Communications, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1090
(1989); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), enforced, 395 F.2d 622
(CADC 1968)). An employer, however, must first bargain in good faith and the
new terms of employment must be carefully circumscribed provisions. See id.
140. See id. at 2121-22 (citing Cuyamace Meats, Inc. v. Butchers' & Food Em-
ployers' Pension Trust Fund, 638 F. Supp. 885, 997 (SD Cal. 1986), affd, 827 F.2d
491 (9th Cir. 1987); El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1995);
Paramount Liquor Co., 307 N.LR.B. 676, 686 (1992); NKS Distrib., Inc., 304
N.L.R.B. 338, 340-41 (1991), rev'd, 50 F.3d 18 (9th Cir. 1995); Sage Dev. Co., 301
N.L.R.B. 1173, 1175 (1991); Walker Constr. Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 746, 748 (1990),
enforced, 928 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1991); Food Employers Council, Inc., 293 N.L.R-B.
333, 334, 345-46 (1989); Tile, Terazzo & Marble Contractors Ass'n., 287 N.L.R.B.
769, 772 (1987), enforced, 935 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991); Salinas Valley Ford Sales,
Inc., 279 N.L.R-B. 679, 686, 690 (1986); Carlsen Porsche Audi Inc., 266 N.L.R.B.
141, 152-53 (1983); Typographic Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1978); United Fire
Proof Warehouse Co. v. N.L.R.B., 356 F.2d 494, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1966)).
The NLRB has also stated that the member clubs of the NFL "constitute a single
employer for bargaining purposes." Brief for Respondent at 47, Brown v. Pro Foot-
bal, 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996) (No. 95-388)(quoting NFL Management Council,
N.L.R.B. 958, 961 (1973)).
141. Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2122 (citing Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 30, 51 S. Ct. 42, 75 L. Ed. 145 (1930) (discussing agreement
to insert arbitration provisions in motion picture licensing pictures)).
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The majority concluded that there was no plausible way anti-
trust law could be applied in a situation such as the one in Brown,
where the employers imposed the salary cap after collective bar-
gaining reached impasse. 142 The majority found that if the nonstat-
utory labor exemption expired at impasse, there would be no legal
alternate actions for the employers to invoke.1 43 If all of the em-
ployers had implemented terms similar to their last joint offer, they
would be faced with an antitrust action. 144 The Court noted that if
the employers had individually imposed terms which differed from
their last offer in the collective bargaining discussions, they would
be facing an unfair labor practice claim. 145 Further, had the em-
ployers met prior to or subsequent to impasse, they would have
been faced with antitrust claims.' 46 Justice Breyer described the
employers as being caught in a "Catch 22," and no matter which
way they turned, the employers would be in violation of either anti-
trust laws or labor laws. 147 Therefore, the Court concluded that "to
permit antitrust liability here threatens to introduce instability and
uncertainty into the collective bargaining process, for antitrust law
often forbids or discourages the kinds of joint discussions and be-
havior that the collective bargaining process invites or requires."1 48
In conclusion, the majority stated that the holding in Brown
does not "insulate from antitrust review every joint imposition of
terms by employers."1 4 9 The majority however, held that there was
no need in the present case to decide these "outer boundaries"
which would be subject to antitrust review. 150 The Supreme Court
142. See id. at 2123. The majority held that labor law and the NLRB, not the
antitrust courts, have primary responsibility for reviewing and implementing the
collective bargaining process. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. Under antitrust laws, employers imposing similar terms may be in
violation of antitrust laws for their identical behavior tending to show a common
understanding or agreement. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2123. Justice Breyer stated that had the NFL own-
ers met prior to impasse, the employers could have been charged with an antitrust
claim alleging that they agreed to limit the kinds of actions they would take should
impasse occur. See id. In addition, the players could have asserted the same anti-
trust claim if the owners had met after impasse, by claiming that the owners ille-
gally agreed upon what action to take prior to renewed negotiations. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2127. The majority recognized that there may be instances where
the agreement could be "distant"in time and under circumstances that would re-
quire antitrust intervention. See id. See, e.g., El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316
N.L.R.B. 1005, 1006-07 (1995) (suggesting that "extremely long impasse would jus-
tify union withdrawal from group bargaining").
150. See Brown, 116 S.CL at 2127.
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therefore concluded that the implicit (nonstatutory) labor exemp-
tion applied to the employers' conduct which had taken place dur-
ing and immediately following collective bargaining. 151 The
employers' conduct was directly related to the "lawful operation of
the bargaining process, [i] t involved a matter that the parties were
required to negotiate and it concerned only the parties to the col-
lective bargaining relationship."'152
The Developmental Squad Players argued to the Supreme
Court that the nonstatutory labor exemption applies only to labor-
management agreements and that the exemption must rest upon
labor-management consent.153 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument and held that the exemption cannot be limited to only
those understandings embodied in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.154 The majority defined the collective bargaining process as
an ongoing process that involves the time period prior to and sub-
sequent to the time in which the actual agreement is finalized. 155
Further, in a multi-employer bargaining process as is exemplified in
Brown, there are many procedural and substantive understandings
among the employers as well as within the union. 156 Therefore,
the majority held that the exemption does not apply "only insofar
as both labor and management consent to those
understandings." 157
In the amicus brief for players, the Solicitor General argued
that the nonstatutory labor exemption should end at the point of
impasse. 158 The basic premise of the Solicitor General's argument
was that an employer (if not bound by antitrust law at the point of
impasse) does not have a duty to act in good faith and can act inde-
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 2123. The players argued that based on prior Supreme Court
decisions, the labor exemption only applies to understandings within the collective
bargaining agreement. See id. (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfit-
ters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)).
154. See id. at 2123.
155. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2123.
156. See id.
157. Id. The majority held that this cannot possibly be the correct application
of the exemption. See id. The majority noted that there are certain collective bar-
gaining positions that the employer will maintain to which the unions should not
consent, but which are exempt under the nonstatutory labor exemption. See id.
158. See id. at 2124. The Solicitor General argued that "employers no longer
have a duty under the labor laws to maintain the status quo... [and] are free as a
matter of labor law to negotiate individual arrangements on an interim basis with
the union." Brief for the United States of America at 17, Brown v. Pro Football, 116
S.Ct. 2116 (1996)(No. 95-388).
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pendently. 159 The Supreme Court rejected this argument as
well. 160 The Court held that an employer is not free to act indepen-
dently after impasse' 6 ' because labor laws limit an employer's alter-
natives once impasse occurs. 162 The majority also rejected the
Solicitor General's argument because ending the exemption at im-
passe would cause antitrust courts to decide "the lawfulness of activ-
ities intimately related to the bargaining process," which was what
the Court wanted to avoid. 163
Additionally, the players argued that regardless of how the
nonstatutory labor exemption applies in the normal labor law con-
text, professional sports is unique and therefore the exemption
should apply in a different way.'6 Although the majority consid-
ered the unique "interest, excitement or concern" in sports, the
Court held that professional sports is not unique in respect to labor
law and the nonstatutory labor exemption. 165 Therefore, the ma-
jority concluded that there was no satisfactory reason to distinguish
football players from other organized workers. 166
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, concluded that the majority
opinion did not coincide with the labor laws and antitrust laws or
with the congressional intent of the statutes from which the non-
statutory labor exemption is derived.' 67 Justice Stevens found that
159. See Brown, 116 S.CL at 2124.
160. See id.
161. See id. The Court held that "[e]mployers... are not completely free at
impasse to act independently. The multi-employer bargaining unit ordinarily re-
mains intact; individual employers cannot withdraw." Id.
162. See id. The Court stated that there are four options available to an em-
ployer once impasse occurs: (1) maintaining status quo, (2) implementing the last
offer, (3) locking out the workers, or (4) negotiating separate interim agreements
with the union. See id. The majority found, however, that if the employers were to
invoke these alternatives without the exemption in place, the employers would be
subject to antitrust attack. See id.
Additionally, the Court questioned what would happen if the parties could
not reach an interim agreement. See id. The Court concluded that if there is no
interim agreement, uniform employer conduct would be likely to occur, which
would then invite antitrust attack by the union. See id.
163. Id.
164. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2126.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that in his
view:
neither the policies underlying the two separate statutory schemes, nor
the narrower focus on the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption, pro-
vides ajustification for exempting from antitrust scrutiny collective action
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because of unique features within the Brown case, 168 the employers
should not be entitled to an exemption from antitrust liability.169
Justice Stevens determined that the employers acted solely out of
competitive interests170 because there was no dispute between the
employers and the players as to the pre-existing principle that the
players' salaries would be individually negotiated.171 Justice Stevens
argued that the only reason the employers imposed the fixed wage
rate was to prevent certain owners from gaining an unfair advan-
tage by "evading roster limits."1 72 Finding that the employers' inter-
ests were competitive and not regulatory, Justice Stevens stated that
the employers' anticompetitive actions should not be protected by
the nonstatutory labor exemption. 73
Justice Stevens concluded that the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion is not automatically triggered merely because an antitrust chal-
lenge touches on an area of labor law contained in collective
bargaining.174 According to Justice Stevens, the majority failed to
recognize Supreme Court precedent by finding that the types of
initiated by employers to depress wages below the level that would be
produced in a free market.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further stated that in his view, the ma-
jority opinion "glosses over"the unique feature of the case and misses the critical
inquiry into whether labor law requires extension of the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion to a case such as this. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that
there were three unique features to the Brown case that were critical to the inquiry
of the Court. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). These features include: first, the
sports market is unlike any other market because player salaries are individually
negotiated; second, the employers imposed the wage restraint on the developmen-
tal squad players in order to force all owners to comply with the league-wide rules
that limited the number of players; third, even though the employers notified the
union that they were going to implement a uniform wage for the developmental
squad players, the new wage standard was not bargained for between the parties
but rather unilaterally implemented by the owners without union agreement. See
id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 667 (1965)). Justice Stevens recognized that the Court has previously
held that "some collective action by employers may justify an exemption because it
is necessary to maintain the 'integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit.'" Id.(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965)). How-
ever, here Justice Stevens found that the actions by the employers were anticompe-
titive in nature. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pennington, 381 U.S. at 667).
174. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens re-jected the majority's rationale that "almost any concerted action by employers that
touches on a mandatory subject of collective bargaining . . . should be immune
from scrutiny so long as the collective bargaining process is in place." Id. at 2131
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disputes as in Brown are immune from antitrust laws.175 Justice Ste-
vens explained that the Supreme Court in Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington176 held that the exemption is not triggered merely because
the antitrust action involves the area of collective bargaining. 77
Justice Stevens noted that the Brown majority attempted to recon-
cile Pennington at the close of its opinion when it stated that the
nonstatutory labor exemption applies in Brown because the employ-
ers' action "grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful oper-
ation of the bargaining process .... It involved a matter that the
parties were required to negotiate collectively . . . . And it con-
cerned only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship."17 8
Justice Stevens, in conjunction with the majority, recognized that
the Brown case, unlike Pennington, involved the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 79 He reconciled this difference by ex-
plaining that the difference between Brown and Pennington does not
affect the relevant analysis applied by the Court in Pennington to
determine whether the nonstatutory labor exemption applies.' 80
The Pennington analysis requires a court to undertake "a detailed
examination into whether the policies of labor law so strongly sup-
ported the agreement struck by the bargaining parties that it
should be immune from antitrust scrutiny."181 Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the majority, ignoring the Pennington analysis, wrong-
fully concluded that the exemption should apply merely because
the employers' actions were implemented during the lawful collec-
175. See id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens recognized that
Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that antitrust courts should be kept
out of the collective bargaining process. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He found
that the precedent subscribing to this notion does not justify the majority's conclu-
sion "that employees have no recourse other than the Labor Board when employ-
ers collectively undertake anticompetitive action. In fact, they contradict it." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pennington, 381 U.S. at 663 (holding that mere fact
that antitrust challenge touches on issue that is subject to collective bargaining
does not mean nonstatutory labor exemption is automatically triggered)).
176. 381 U.S. 657, 663 (1965).
177. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pennington,
381 U.S. at 664).
178. Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2126-27.
179. See id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens recognized that in
Pennington, unlike Brown, the employers actions affected more than just the parties
to the agreement. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that even
though the circumstances surrounding Brown and Pennington differed, the analysis
used in Pennington was still applicable in Brown because it deals with whether the
exemption is applicable. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting) (citing Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65). Justice
Stevens saw this analysis as the "basic analysis"for a court to follow when determin-
ing whether the nonstatutory labor exemption applies. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tive bargaining process.18 2 He further concluded that the major-
ity's rationale constitutes an "unprecedented expansion" of the
nonstatutory labor exemption.183
Justice Stevens rejected the majority's contention that prior
caselaw supports its rationale. 184 He rejected the majority's reliance
on Amalgamiated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea,185 stating that the Court in
Jewel Tea was only concerned with the question of whether the non-
statutory labor exemption applies to an agreement between an em-
ployer and a union. 186 Justice Stevens stated that in Jewel Tea,
Justice White (also the author of the Pennington opinion) explained
that the Court must analyze the bargaining process and decide
whether it should be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 187 Justice Stevens
found that the Jewel Tea case establishes that the "crucial determi-
nant" in determining whether the exemption applies is not what
the terms are but rather the impact that the agreement will have on
the market and the interests of the union members. 188 He found
no language in Jewel Tea stating that the exemption applies merely
because an antitrust action arises out of the collective bargaining
process. 189
Justice Stevens, rejecting the majority's reasoning supporting
the applicability of the nonstatutory labor exemption agreed with
the District Court holding and stated that:
[b] ecause the developmental squad salary positions were a
new concept and not a change in terms of the expired
collective bargaining agreement, the policy behind contin-
uing the nonstatutory labor exemption for the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement after expiration (to foster
an atmosphere conducive to the negotiation of a new col-
lective bargaining agreement) does not apply.'90
182. See id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (StevensJ, dissenting). Justice Stevens found that the Court's analy-
sis not only expanded the exemption, but that it also repudiated the reasoning in
.a prior, unconstitutional decision that Congress itself had not seen fit to over-
ride." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
186. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 688-97).
188. Id. at 2132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690).
189. See id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Pro Football, 782
F.Supp. 125, 139 (D.D.C. Cir. 1991)).
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He found that extending the nonstatutory labor exemption to
shield the NFL from antitrust law infringes on the union's freedom
to contract and contradicts the very purpose of the antitrust ex-
emption and labor law. 191 Justice Stevens concluded that the ma-
jority's opinion forces labor unions to accept terms that they would
never agree to initially because the employers may unilaterally im-
pose employment terms, which violate antitrust law, without the
threat of antitrust liability. 192
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.'93 is one of many recent cases involv-
ing the nonstatutory labor exemption in professional sports.194
The Brown Court examined the history of antitrust law and federal
labor law and determined that the nonstatutory labor exemption is
applicable even after collective bargaining reaches the point of im-
passe. 195 In doing so however, the Brown Court failed to recognize:
the purpose of the nonstatutory labor exemption and the purpose
of the NLRA.
A. Purpose of Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
The Brown decision fails to follow precedent established by the
Supreme Court concerning the applicability of the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption. In Connell Construction v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Lo-
cal 100,196 the Supreme Court explained that the nonstatutory
labor exemption has its source in strong labor policy favoring the
association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and
working conditions. 197 The Supreme Court in Connell realized the
need for the nonstatutory labor exemption because of the conflict-
ing interests between the congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining and the congressional policy favoring free competition
in business.198 In Brown, however, the majority disregarded the fact
that the nonstatutory labor exemption was established as a solution
191. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
194. See id.
195. See id. (stating that National Football League was lawfully permitted to
impose unilateral restraints on players, because it was legitimate means to settle
dispute).
196. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
197. See id. at 689.
198. See id. at 622 (holding Supreme Court has realized that "labor policy
requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences
in wages and working conditions").
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to conflict, with one side of the conflict being the negotiating par-
ties' collective bargaining interests.1 99 The Brown Court, by ex-
tending the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond impasse, allowed
the employer to impose unilateral restraints outside of the collec-
tive bargaining process without fear of antitrust violation.200 How-
ever, at impasse there is no collective bargaining occurring, and as a
result, there is no conflict between the congressional policy favor-
ing collective bargaining and the antitrust policy.20 1 Therefore,
under the Supreme Court precedent set in Connel4 the Brown Court
overextended the application of the nonstatutory labor exemption
by allowing the exemption to apply where it was not intended to
apply.
The Brown decision also fails to recognize that a goal of the
judiciary is to avoid intervening in the collective bargaining process,
and to leave negotiations and settlement to the employers and the
union.20 2 The NLRA establishes the boundaries within which em-
ployers and unions may lawfully act in reaching a collective bargain-
ing agreement.20 3 The Brown Court, however, decided to increase
the employer's protections, in relation to" antitrust law, by ex-
tending the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond the point of im-
passe. The nonstatutory labor exemption was created out of
"strong labor policy favoring association of employees to eliminate
competition over wages and working conditions."20 4 The Brown de-
cision, however, extends protection to the employers to associate in
order to eliminate competition in negotiating employee wages. In
the Brown case, the employers imposed a fixed salary, even though
199. See Brown v. Pro Footbal, 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996); Connell Constr. v. Plumb-
ers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1994).
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). Under this section collective bargaining is
defined as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
. " Id.
201. Compare Connell Constr. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S.
616 (1975) (realizing need for nonstatutory labor exemption because of conflict
involving collective bargaining process) with Brown v. Pro Football, 116 S.Ct. 2116
(1996) (allowing nonstatutory exemption to apply after point of impasse, where
there is no collective bargaining interest).
202. See Corcoran, supra note 26, at 1065 (stating that courts should not get
involved in settlement of collective bargaining disputes between employers and
unions, but rather should let both parties resolve problem).
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
204. Connell 421 U.S. at 622.
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there was no dispute over the pre-existing individual
negotiations. 205
Lastly, the Brown decision applies the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption to a unilateral action, which contradicts the Supreme
Court's basis for establishing the nonstatutory exemption. 206 The
Supreme Court recognized that the process of collective bargain-
ing, a bilateral action, needed protection from antitrust law.20 7
Thus, in Brown, once bargaining reached impasse, the employers
actions became unilateral and therefore should have been analyzed
under the statutory labor exemption.208
B. Purpose of the NLRA
The Brown Court's broad interpretation of the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the NLRA. 20 9 The NLRA provides economic weapons for
both employers and unions to be used in the bargaining process
and negotiations to reach a new agreement.2 10 The Supreme Court
has held that the basic purpose of the NLRA was that "through col-
lective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior
years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions lead-
ing ... to mutual agreement."211
The Brown decision extends the employer's permitted actions
under the NLRA to include an antitrust exemption. The Brown
Court, with no legislative history to support it, extended the non-
statutory labor exemption simply because the negotiations involved
a compulsory subject of collective bargaining. In Brown, the Court
failed to undertake a review of the policies surrounding the NLRA,
and instead decided to extend this limited exemption. Had Con-
gress wanted to exempt the employer from antitrust law after im-
passe, so that the employees would have to strike as their only
205. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996) (holding NFL was
free to impose restraints once at point of impasse, thereby ending bargaining).
206. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965) (holding nonstatutory labor exemption needed to shield agreed-upon re-
straints, bilateral actions between employers and unions, concerning mandatory
bargaining subjects).
207. See id. at 689.
208. See id.
209. See H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970) (stating that NLRA "de-
clares it to be the policy of the United States to promote the establishment of
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment by free collective
bargaining between employers and unions."). For a discussion of the National
Labor Relations Act, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
210. See H.K Porter, 397 U.S. at 103.
211. Id.
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means of bargaining for their salaries, the NLRA would have pro-
vided for it.21 2
The Supreme Court has held that through collective bargain-
ing, the employer and employee should reach an agreement. Yet,
the Brown court does not follow this Supreme Court precedent.213
Congress expressly included mandatory collective bargaining in the
NLRA.214 The Brown Court, though, allows employers to unilater-
ally impose a restraint on players which is a mandatory bargaining
subject under the NLRA.2 15
VI. IMPACT
The Brown decision, allowing employers to impose unilateral
restraints on employees once collective bargaining reaches impasse,
severely inhibits the collective bargaining process. The Court's
broad interpretation of the nonstatutory labor exemption has seri-
ous ramifications on union/employer relations in the professional
sports industry.
The Brown decision creates a disincentive for both employers
and unions to collectively bargain. The collective bargaining pro-
cess is intended for unions and employers to negotiate and reach
an acceptable agreement as to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.2 1 6 The Brown Court's application of the nonstatutory labor
exemption allows employers to dictate and enforce the employer's
terms and conditions, restraining competition. The employers
have no incentive to negotiate with the players in order to reach an
agreement, because once negotiations reach impasse, the employ-
ers can impose unilateral restraints on the players without a fear of
antitrust liability.2 1 7 The employers can lawfully restrain competi-
tion, even if the players do not agree to the terms. The unions
similarly have no incentive to bargain because the employers can
212. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
213. Compare H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 101 (1970) (emphasizing that
"allowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable
to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based - pri-
vate bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without
any official compulsion over the terms of the contract.") with Brown v. Pro-Foot-
ball, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996) (allowing employers to settle agreement without
bargaining).
214. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). For the text of § 158, see supra note 59
and accompanying text.
215. See 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1994). For the text of § 158, see supra note 59
and accompanying text.
217. See Brown, 116 S.Ct. at 2119.
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do what they want after impasse. The players know that the employ-
ers are merely mechanically negotiating, having no intention of
reaching an agreement.218
This lack of incentive for collective bargaining deprives the
professional sports players of certain rights provided by the
NLRA. 219 The NLRA states that it is unfair labor practice for an
employer to restrain employees in the exercise of their rights pro-
vided under section 157.220 Also, employees have the right to re-
fuse employers' terms or conditions not included in a current
collective bargaining agreement. 221 The Brown Court, though, de-
prives the employees of this right of refusal. The Brown court gives
the employers the power to restrain competition and impose non-
negotiable terms upon players without their consent, and limits the
players to strike as their only retaliation against the salary cap.
The Brown Court's broad interpretation of the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption is inconsistent with both congressional policies of
antitrust laws, established and maintained for over a hundred years,
and the NLRA, established and maintained for almost fifty years.
Extending the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond impasse tips
the scales of the collective bargaining process in favor of the em-
ployers, thereby circumventing the collective bargaining process al-
together. The Brown decision may lead to the end of collective
bargaining in professional sports, which will eventually lead to the
destruction of the professional sports industry. Players are not go-
ing to be willing to work in an industry where they have no power
or bargaining rights against the employer concerning employment
terms and conditions, and where the employers are not subject to
scrutiny for their unilateral anti-competitive actions. In order to
maintain order in the professional sports industry, the nonstatutory
labor exemption must end at the point of impasse. Both employers
and employees must be forced to use bargaining weapons provided
under the NLRA to reach a collective bargaining agreement.
Denise K. Bryant
218. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 F.3d 1041, 1064 n.6 (Ward, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704, 706 (9th Cir. 1980)) (stating
that "[a] related concern is that some employers may be embodied to go beyond
hard bargaining and engage in 'surface bargaining, merely, going through the
motions of negotiating'").
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1994). For the text of § 158, see supra note 59
and accompanying text.
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
221. See id.
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